Noam Nisan: noam@cs.huji.ac.il. Office: Ross building room
218. Office hour: Tuesday
Daniel Lehmann: lehmann@cs.huji.ac.il. Office:
Tuesday
The first two lectures are introductory and given by the instructors. The rest of the course is talks by students.
|
Date |
Speaker |
Topic |
Slides |
|
12.3 |
Noam |
Computers, The Internet, Games, and Mechanism Design |
---- |
|
19.3 |
Daniel |
Auctions and Combinatorial Auctions |
---- |
|
Pesach |
--- |
. |
. |
|
9.4 |
|||
|
Yom Zikaron |
--- |
. |
. |
|
23.4 |
|||
|
30.4 |
Yair Weinberger Avinatan Hassidim |
||
|
7.5 |
Matan Protter Oren Mizrahi |
||
|
14.5 |
|||
|
Yom student |
--- |
. |
. |
|
28.5 |
|||
|
4.6 |
|||
|
11.6 |
|||
|
18.6 |
|||
|
25.6 |
Each student may choose one of the papers listed below. You may alternatively suggest another paper from recent conferences or from a course in another university on the same topic. “Kol-hokodem zocheh” in terms of choosing papers and dates. This list does not include any paper that was covered last year, nor may you choose such a paper.
1. Incentive Compatible Interdomain Routing by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker
2. Frugal Path Mechanisms by A. Archer and E. Tardos
3. Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard by T. Roughgarden
4. On approximating optimal auctions by A. Ronen
5. Competitive Generalized Auctions by Fiat, Hartline, Goldberg, and Karlin
6. Leveled commitment contracts and strategic breach by Sandholm and Lesser
7. Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games by Jain and V. Vazirani
8. Graphical models in game theory
9. Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisibilities by Sushil Bikhchandani and John W. Mamer
10. Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes by F. Gul and E. Stacchetti
11. Substitutes, Complements and Equilibrium in two-sided Market Models by V. I. Danilov and G. A. Koshevoy and C. Lang
12. Multi-Item Auctions by Demange, G., D. Gale, and M.Sotomayor
13. Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice by Parkes, D. C. and L. H. Ungar
14. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding by Ausubel, L. and P. Milgrom
15.
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions by R.
Holzman, N. Kfir-Dahav, D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz
16. Statistical learnability and
rationality of choice by
17. Truthful Mechanisms for one parameter agents by A. Archer and E. Tardos
·
·
Yale: Economics and Computation by
· Harvard: Computational Mechanism Design by David Parkes
· UCSB: Computation and Market Mechanisms by Subhash Suri and Rich Wolski
· CMU: Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces by Toumas Sandholm
· Harvard: Market Design by Al Roth and Paul Milgrom
· Brown: Topics in Internet agent economics by Amy Greenwald
· Stanford: Technical Foundations of Electronic Commerce by Bonneh, Fox, Shoham, and Ullman
· Technion: Advanced Topics in Game Theory by Dov Monderer