Noam Nisan: noam@cs.huji.ac.il. Office: Ross building room 218. Office hour: Tuesday 11-12.

Motty Perry: motty@math.huji.ac.il

1. Strategy-proof sharing of submodular costs by H. Moulin and S. Shenker and Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions by Joan Feigenbaum, Christos Papadimitriou and Scott Shenker.
2. Combinatorial auctions: a survey by Sven de Vries and Rakesh Vohra.
3. How Bad is Selfish Routing? by Roughgarden and Tardos and Stackelberg Scheduling by Roughgarden
4. Bounded Rationality and Computational Complexity by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis
5. Competitive Auctions and Digital Goods by Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, and Andrew Wright and Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods by Andrew V. Goldberg and Jason D. Hartline
6. Resource Pricing and the Evolution of Congestion Control by Gibbens and Kelly
7. Rational Learning and Nash Equilibrium by Kalai and Lehrer
8. Privacy-Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design by Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas, and Reuben Sumner
9. Economic incentives in software design, Chapter 3 by Hal Varian
10. Strategyproofness via LP Duality by Jain and V. Vazirani
11. Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions" by Daniel Lehmann, Liadan O'Callaghan and Yoav Shoham
12. Distributed Rational Decision Making (survey) by T. Sandholm
13. Learning and Implementation on the Internet by E. Freidman and S. Shenker
14. Putting Auction Theory to Work: Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding by Paul Milgrom
15. Efficient Auctions by P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin
16. Implementation Theory by E. Maskin and T. Sjostrom
17. Efficiency and Information Aggregation and Strategic Voting by W. Pesendorfer and M.Swinkels
18. Convergence to Efficiency in A Simple Market with Incomplete Information by A. Rustichini, M. Satterthwaite and S. Williams and The optimality of a simple market mechanism by M. Satterthwaite and S. Williams
19. Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Natural Experiment on the Internet by A. Roth, and A. Ockenfels
20. An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities by L. Ausubel
21. Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations by Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu

• Berkeley: Algorithmic Aspects of Game Theory by Christos Papadimitriou
• Yale: E-commerce foundations by Joan Feigenbaum
• Michigan: Information economics by Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason
• Brown: Topics in Internet agent economics by Amy Greenwald